Strengthening the Strategic and Operational Response for Reducing COVID-19 Transmission in Indonesia by Sutomo, Sumengen et al.
Copyright @ 2021 Kesmas: Jurnal Kesehatan Masyarakat Nasional (National Public Health Journal), p-ISSN: 1907-7505, e-ISSN: 2460-0601, SINTA-S1 accredited,
http://journal.fkm.ui.ac.id/kesmas, Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
Correspondence*: Sumengen Sutomo, Department of Environmental Health, 
Faculty of Public Health, University of Indonesia. Kampus Depok Universitas 
Indonesia Depok Jawa Barat 16424, Indonesia,
E-mail: sumengensutomo@yahoo.com, Phone: +62217863479; +62218307603
Sutomo et al. Kesmas: Jurnal Kesehatan Masyarakat Nasional (National Public Health 
Journal). 2021; 16 (Special Issue 1): 3-10.
DOI: 10.21109/kesmas.v0i0.5104
Abstract
Indonesia reported the first two cases of COVID-19 from Depok City, West Java, on March 2, 2020. This study aimed to evaluate the strategic response for 
reducing the COVID-19 transmission which mainly comprised case management, large-scale social restrictions, including micro-scale social restrictions, and 
the development of drugs and vaccines. The data were collected from the Indonesian Government’s official websites and the latest information from March 
2020 to May 2021. A logical framework approach and a theory of change were used to describe, evaluate, and strengthen the strategic response. The current 
strategic response has not reduce the COVID-19 transmission. As of May 30, 2021, 1,879,730 confirmed cases with 101,639 active cases, 1,663,998 
recovered, and 50,404 deaths have been reported from 34 provinces. The case management faced a high positive rate and case fatality. The large-
scale social restrictions have not increased public awareness and behavior practice on the prevention and control. Currently, there is no cure, and the 
vaccination needs more time to complete. Strengthening the current strategic response needs more testing, contact tracing, better quality treatment, 
community education for behavior change, and effective vaccination.
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Introduction
Indonesia reported the first two cases of COVID-19 
in Depok city, West Java on March 2, 2020.1 
The number of cases has continuously increased, causing 
high morbidity and mortality from cities and districts. 
The Government formed Task Forces for COVID-19 
Mitigation (Task Force) to support high-level 
coordination of the national response for the pandemic 
on March 3, 2020.2 This Force implemented a primary 
strategic response for physical distancing through 
mask-wearing at public places, contact tracing, rapid 
diagnostic test (RDT) or real-time polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR). They implemented screening and 
education for self-isolation with medical care at the 
general, referral, or emergency hospitals. The 
Ministry of Health (MoH) provided leadership for 
health system response and adopted its influenza 
pandemic contingency plan for the COVID-19 
response.3 The government also declared a regulation 
on large-scale social restrictions (LSSR)/Pembatasan 
Sosial Berskala Besar (PSBB) in response to the 
pandemic on March 31 which aimed to prevent the spread
of the virus. Local governments were allowed to 
confine the movement of people or goods in 
and out of their respective localities, closing public 
places, schools, restricting public transport, and 
limiting travel to and from the provinces or regions with 
the approval of the MoH.4
The President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo declared the 
pandemic as a National disaster and adopted LSSR based 
on the Health Quarantines Law 2018.5 It was also 
included as a non-natural disaster by National Disaster 
Management Office on April 3.6 In line with the 2020 
World Health Organization (WHO) strategic preparation 
and response plan, Indonesian Government, through the 
MoH and the National Disaster Management Agency/ 
Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB) 
responded to the fight against COVID-19 pandemic on 
April 4.7 The outbreak was categorized as a National non-
natural disaster due to its various impacts on 
humanitarian, public health, education, social, cultural, 
and economy. A road map with the protocol was 
issued by the Task Force for accelerating the 
handling of COVID-19 and the fight against the virus.
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The protocol's goal included saving the lives of the 
population, provision of basic human needs, reducing 
the impact on socio-economic, and preventing the 
spread of the virus. It also provided guides on the role 
and responsibility of the subnational and local leaders, 
such as data collection, analysis, information ma- 
nagement, coordination with stakeholders, public 
communication, safety or security, LSSR, and 
stakeholder participation. The strategic response plan 
of health operation, education, economy, distribution 
logistic, monitoring, evaluation, and early diagnostic 
mechanisms were also included in the protocol.8
From August 11 to 14, 2020, the World Health 
Organization Intra-Action Review of Indonesia's 
Response to COVID-19 conducted a national review of 
the strategic and operational response. This was assessed 
based on the nine pillars of the strategic preparedness 
and plan to identify areas within the public health res-
ponse that require remediation and improvement. The 
participants included various representatives units within 
the Republic of Indonesia MoH, other Government 
Departments, WHO, and the United Nations agencies 
who met virtually to review the progress. The results 
showed the current strategic response was limited coor-
dination and communication between sectors at the na-
tional and subnational. It also had limited monitoring in-
dicators, data, and information management, such as de-
layed reporting or mismatched data and limited utiliza-
tion of health facilities.9 The government, through the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, modified the LSRR 
into micro-scale activities restriction/ 
Pemberlakuan Pembatasan Kegiatan Masyarakat (PPKM) 
on January 7, 2021, and enforced on January 11, 
2021. The measures, which were implemented in 
10 provinces of Java and Bali included limiting 
activities at workplaces, restaurants, or shopping 
centers, and fully approving essential sectors 
activities. On March 23, 2021  PPKM was extended to 
most Indonesia's provinces.10
Over the past 14 months, the implementation of the 
strategic response has not reduced the pandemic trans-
mission. On May 30, 2021, the number of cases increased 
to 1,879,730 confirmed, 101,639 active, 1,663,998 re-
covered, and 50,404 deaths.11 Several studies were re-
ported on the strategic and operational responsibility of 
reducing the COVID-19 transmission, which includes re-
views on community perception, knowledge, awareness, 
and behavior practice on its prevention and control. Most 
of these studies showed the response affected public un-
derstanding but limited behavior practice on the preven-
tion and control. Most people ignored mask-wearing in 
public, maintaining social distance in crowded areas, and 
avoiding overcrowded public places. Moreover, there are 
few studies based on impact evaluation of the strategic
response. Why has the COVID-19 transmission not re-
duced? What are the causes? How can the current strate-
gic response be strengthened? This study aims to under-
stand the problem, challenges, proposed solutions, and 
strengthening the current strategic response for reducing 
virus transmission. However, the usual implementation 
of this response has not reduced the transmission but 
worsen it. Strengthening the current strategic response 
is required to aid in reducing the disease transmission 
curve and save more lives.
Method
A logical framework approach (LFA) was used to de-
scribe the current strategic response, while the theory of 
change (ToC)  evaluate the impact, outcome, and outputs 
for the basis of its strengthening. Data were obtained 
from the official websites of Indonesian Governments 
and the latest information from March 2020 to May 
2021. The LFA is an analytical or management tool uti-
lized by most multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, in-
ternational non-governmental organizations, as well as 
several partner governments for the development pro-
gram or projects. It is an effective tool when 
understood and intelligently applied. It also des-
cribed the current strategic response, including the goal, 
objective, outputs, indicators, strategy, activities, and risk 
of achieving the objectives according to the vertical or 
horizontal logic.12 The results provided a basis for the 
response evaluation.
The ToC is a planning method that works backward 
through a logic model from a statement of the desired 
impact that the organization plans to achieve through 
one or more desired outcomes that need to be achieved 
before the impact can happen to the outputs that should 
be planned to reach the desired results. The evaluation 
objective was to identify the problem, causes, effect, and 
key success factors for strengthening the response. It is a 
comparison of the actual results with the desired ones, 
including the impact, outcome, and output before its im-
plementation.13 Also, the evaluation results provided the 
government and its stakeholders, including the commu-
nity, to continue the fight against COVID-19 and 
strengthening the current strategic response (Figure 1).
Results 
Strategic Response
      The overall strategic response was to reduce the pan-
demic transmission with a target of a reproductive num-
ber less than one (RO <1.0) through case management, 
LSSR, as well as drugs and vaccines development. Case 
management, which is a medical care approach, helped 
to reduce morbidity and mortality by reducing positivity 
and case fatality rate (CFR) with <5% and <3% targets 
respectively. The main activities included testing, contact
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tracing, isolation, and treatment. A rapid test (RT) for 
antibody, and antigen, as well as real-time polymerase 
chain reaction (RT-PCR) provided epidemiological data. 
The RT antibody was carried out for contact cases of 
positive patients and those under supervision in areas 
with no RT-PCR test. In addition, the results were 
confirmed by RT-PCR.14,15
The LSSR was a prevention approach to 
reduce the COVID-19 transmission through 
community mobilization and participation. It was 
also an estimated target to increase public 
(>80%) knowledge, attitude, and behavior practice 
on prevention and control. The MoH guided LSSR 
by suspending activities at schools, workplaces, 
religious worship, public facilities, social-cultural, 
and transportation. The population was 
encouraged to implement mask-wearing, maintaining a 
minimum 1-1.5 meters distance from others, and 
regular hand-washing with soap in running water for 20 
seconds, which was applied in all provinces, cities, and 
districts. The government through the Ministry of 
Internal Affair, modified LSSR to micro-scale activity 
restrictions as implemented by Java and Bali provinces 
on January 11, 2021, and subsequently to others 
regions.16
The development of drugs and vaccines was to 
strengthen both strategies in reducing COVID-19 trans-
mission. This aims to ensure the utilization of medica-
tions for treatment and vaccines in public immunity, 
targeting their availability for prevention. The 
government through the MoH and Task Force, partnered 
with research institutes, private sector, local pharmaceu-
tical companies, and foreign countries developing drugs
and vaccines. These include the National Institute of 
Science, Eijkman Institute for Molecular Biology, PT Bio 
Farma, National Institute of Health Research and 
Development, Research Institute of the Universitas 
Indonesia, Gadjah Mada University, as well as Airlangga 
University.
Evaluation Strategic Response
     Over the past 14 months, the current strategic res- 
ponse had not reduced the transmission. As of May 31, 
2021, the number of cases had increased to 1,927,027 
confirmed, 102,006 active, 1,669,119 recovered, and 
50,578 deaths from 34 provinces. The RO was estimated 
as >1.0.17 (Figure 2). Assessment of case management, 
LSSR, drugs, and vaccine development explained 
several causes of the problem. 
The case management aid in the reduction of 
morbidity and mortality by reducing positivity rates and 
CFR. Based on the strategic response implementation, a 
weekly average positivity rate was 18.4%, and range of 
12.0-35.5%. A weekly average of CFR was 5%, and 
a range of 3.1-9.5%. The total active and recovered 
cases were 7.3%, and 91% respectively in the last week 
of May 2021. The case management slowly improved 
in July 2020 but remained a burden on health services 
at the central and local levels depending on the 
transmission status. Several government hospitals, such 
as in Jakarta, West Java, and Central Java Provinces, 
reported a bed occupancy ratio (BOR) more than 50% 
in the last week of May 2021. The BOR in COVID-19 
referral hospitals was over 50% in the province of 
North Sumatra, Riau Islands, Riau, South Sumatra, 
Jambi, and Lampung Provinces. After holidays, 
including New Year and Eid holidays, most hospital
Figure 1. The Logic Model (Source: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 2013)13
Figure 2. Cases: Confirmed, Active, Recovered, and Deaths 
March 2, 2020 – May 31, 2021.11
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beds, intensive care unit (ICU) rooms, stock of 
medicines, and oxygen supplies were needed more for 
COVID-19 patients.17,18 The Amnesty International 
Indonesia reported that Indonesia is among the countries 
with the highest number of health workers who have 
lost their lives to COVID-19, with 188 deaths recorded 
as of September 2020.19
The LSSR involved the central and local governments, 
related stakeholders, as well as social media in communi-
ty mobilization or participation for reducing the virus 
transmission. The Task Force reported 24% (range of 
15-37%) of public perception on LSSR as the prohibition
of exit/entry into the area for a certain period. There was
closure of airport and seaports, terminals, train stations,
and marketplace. The Median-NGO reported 55%
(range 52-60%) in the public discipline, compliance to
transportation rules, and temporarily worshiping from
home. The Task Force, Central Agency for Statistics, and
the Median-NGO also reported that public mask-wearing
was 60% when people leave home, 38% had symptoms,
and 42% were interested in buying. According to
UNICEF, the most preventive behavior was the use of
masks (50%) and hand washing (34%). Indonesian Red
Cross reported that 48.5% Indonesian thought the
COVID-19 was not threatening, and 51.5% thought it
was a threat.20,21 A community survey on knowledge, at-
titude, and practice (KAP) of the adult population was
reported by several research teams. Out of the total 640
samples in Yogyakarta (April 2020), 57.1% had a gene-
ral knowledge of COVID-19, 44.9% attitude, and 
43.2%practiced hand-washing, mask-wearing, social 
distancing, coughing etiquette, and nose touching.22 
Furthermore, among the 6,249 undergraduate 
respondents in April-May 2020, 75% have appropriate 
knowledge of the virus, 80.4% have a positive attitude, 
and 69.9% practiced health protocol. There was also a 
significant correlation among knowledge, attitude, and 
practice on health protocol (p <0.000), with an R-
square of 0.04-0.18.23 A national online survey (August 
2020) reported that out of the total 816 sample 
residents over 18 years, 70% had appropriate 
knowledge of the disease, 51.3% focused on the 
symptoms, transmission, and prevention, while 40%had 
a limitation on the spread.24 Micro-scale social 
restriction was extended and implemented in 
most provinces, covering more than 14,000 COVID-19 
posts in 323 districts of 25 provinces.25
The development of drugs and vaccines aims to pro-
duce medicines for patient treatment. The MoH identi-
fied a substantial amount of therapeutics that could hin-
der the disease, such as remdesivir, favipiravir, 
oseltamivir, and lopinavir-ritonavir, which were 
distributed directly to hospitals as an antiviral agent for 
quick recovery in moderately ill patients with 
pneumonia.26 The vaccination program proceeded 
after the Food and Drug Administration granted 
emergency authorization to Sinovac and 
AstraZeneca as well as the  Indonesian Islamic 
Clerical Council approval on January 8, 2021.27,28 This 
program targeted a total of 181.5 million people for 
15 months. On May 3,  20,422,518 people had 
received first and second-dose vaccination where 92.3%, 
77.6%, and 18.1% of the total health workers, public 
services, and older people were included respectively.29 
Development of local vaccines Nusantara, Merah Putih 
with testing tool GeNose C-19 are still in the 
development process (Table 1).
Discussion 
Strategic Response
       The current strategic response had not reduced the 
COVID-19 transmission. In May 2021, the average 
weekly number of the case was 1,786,487 confirmed, 
96,399 active, 1,625,201 recovered, with 48,813 deaths. 
The estimation showed that RO > 1, but there was insuf-
ficient data to calculate Rt.30 Over the past months, the 
incidence rate varied according to the provinces. 
However, nationally it has never been below zero. The 
COVID-19 transmission had not been controlled for sev-
eral reasons such as case management, LSSR, and the 
development of drugs or vaccines. Meanwhile, the 
Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker 
(OxCGRT), using nine indicators including school or 
workplace closures, as well as travel bans was scored at 
the Stringency Policy Index (SPI) scale of 60.2 (range 
13.9-72.7), and 68.9 (100, strictest) on May 13, 2021.31 
Strengthening the current strategic response is required. 
Evaluation of Strategic Response
Case Management
     Testing, which is updated twice a week, is important 
for the understanding of the virus spread and the appro-
priate response. On October 7, 2020, the number of peo-
ple tested daily was 32,167, while the suspected cases 
were 142,213, with a wide gap between both. Over the 
past 14 months, the average weekly proportion tests of 
0.09 per 100,000 population ranged from 0.01 to 0.16. 
This gap had continuously existed due to the limited ca-
pability of laboratories, personnel, reagents, and cost. 
The daily average of the test was 100 persons per case, 
which is less than 1000 recommended by WHO. 
More testing is required to describe the disease 
epidemiology. It is also crucial to increase laboratory 
capacity to ensure the testing of all suspected cases, while 
the RT antigen could be used to scale up the testing ca-
pacity for COVID-19.
The accurate number of tests or contact tracing pro-
vided a better quality of epidemiology data and strategic 
response for reducing the spread. In August 2020, an ave-
rage number of contact tracing was one suspected case
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traced by three persons, which was less than the 10-30 
recommended by WHO.32 With one of the reasons being 
the limited number of trained frontline health workers 
from the community health or sub-health centers, village 
cadres, and volunteers. Also, the low number of testing 
and limited contact tracing indicated insufficient infor-
mation on the epidemiological status of COVID-19 as 
well as the difficulty to decide on the control and preven-
tion of the transmission. More testing and contact tracing 
should be resolved to provide a better strategic decision 
for reducing the transmission. 
Positivity rate and CFR indicated the transmission sta-
tus. According to the reported cases from the first week 
of 2020 to the third week of May 2021, a weekly average 
positivity rate was 15.0% (range 9.0 – 28.8%), with a 
high rate reported in Java-Bali, including DKI Jakarta, 
Central, and East Java, as well as outside the region such 
as North Sumatra, East Kalimantan, and Riau. The posi-
tivity rate increased during the holiday seasons of 
Ramadan, Muslims Eid, and New Year. On May 15, it 
was 13.3% higher than the WHO recommended < 5%. 
The case management was yet to control the pandemic 
spread. In fact, over the past 14 months, the weekly 
average of CFR was 4.2%, with a range of 2.7-8.2%, 
compared to the WHO of <3% for three weeks which 
indicated that the COVID-19 was under control.33 It also 
declined from 2.98% (last week of December 2020) 
to 2.7% (last week of March 2021) and increased to 
2.76% in the second week of May 2021. The CFR was 
higher compared to the global value of 2.3%. Although 
there was an increase in the recovered cases, COVID-19 
remained a burden of the government resources. Most of 
the reported confirmed cases and deaths based on antigen 
RT and PCR were included in the test. It was difficult to 
meet the 90% surveillance criteria of suspected cases 
that were isolated and confirmed within 48 hours of 
symptom onset. At least 80% of new confirmed cases had 
their close contacts traced and quarantined within 72 
hours of confirmation. There was no benchmark for the 
number of close contacts that needed to be traced per
confirmed case as it depends on how quickly they were 
isolated to minimize contact with others.
Over the past year, there had been limited health care 
supplies at the national, province, cities, and district lev-
els, with shortages in laboratory reagents or supplies, per-
sonal protective equipment (PPE), as well as critical med-
ications for treatment. Consequently, more frontline 
health workers were at infection risk due to a lack of pro-
tection, which is a significant burden of health services 
facilities. Since the beginning of the reported cases on 
March 2, 2020, the Indonesian Medical Association had 
reported that at least 647 health workers died due to the 
virus, including 289 doctors, 221 nurses, 84 midwives, 
27 dentists, 15 medical laboratory personnel, and 11 
pharmacists. It was also estimated that 92 of the workers 
died per 100,000 cases, the highest in Asia and the 
fourth-highest fatality rate for health practitioners after 
Mexico, Egypt, and UK.34 Medical care services for non-
communicable diseases such as cancer, diabetes, and 
children immunization were disrupted due to 
COVID-19 priority. Hence, protecting all frontline health 
workers is required to avoid more deaths.
The Large-Scale Social Restriction
      Implementation of LSSR has successfully mobilized 
media, with various general information being provided 
daily on the virus, testing, tracing, transmission, preven-
tion, and vaccination. Several acronyms had been intro-
duced, such as 3M, 5M, 3T, PHBS, Food, and Nutrition. 
The media also provided information integrated into var-
ious purposes of communication, education, and adver-
tisement. The news may be dominated by inaccurate in-
formation or advertisement, therefore, resulting in con-
fusion and panic.
Disinformation and ignoring scientific beliefs have 
circulated the public and affected the government’s abil-
ity to address the pandemic. During the COVID-19 peri-
od, the public needed access to information and recom-
mendations from trusted sources like health profession-
als, scientific experts, experienced patient, and their fam-
Table 1. Summary Evaluation of the Strategic Response
Strategy Goal Objective Target Achieved Finding and recommendation
Overall strategy          Stop transmission         Reduced morbidity         RO<1 RO>1
Reduced mortality
Case management       Contributed reduced    Reduced positivity          <5% 36.1% Feb 2021
Testing, tracing,          morbidity, mortality     rate, Reduced CFR         <3% 25.3% Feb 2021
isolation, treatment
LSSR/PSBB Behavior change           Public awareness           Most public         Low KAP: K59%,
SSSR/PPKM and behavior practice A67.9%, P64.2%
Develop drugs and     Reduced mortality        Drugs available Use 181,5           No medicines for the
vaccine, Local             Public immunity           Most vaccinated             M/15mo cure, Low coverage 
Transmission had not reduced
Strengthen the strategic response
Limited testing, tracing, surveillance 
self-isolation, and treatment, strengthen 
the case management
Massive information, lack of education          
Conduct health education campaign
Limited treatment, Low coverage 
vaccination, Need BPOM Emergency   
Use Authorizationvaccine Increase coverage           More coverage     Incomplete research
8
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ilies. Conversely, they did not receive what they wanted. 
Besides the information on mask-wearing, hand-washing, 
or social distancing, they also needed a correct and accu-
rate explanation of the what, why, and how the virus is 
transmitted. The public has a different level of education, 
social status, risks, or vulnerability and also need differ-
ent messages, communication channel, specific informa-
tion, as well as education on the primary context of the 
pandemic causes, treatment, and prevention. It is there-
fore pertinent that information only is not enough to 
change behavior practice, but also education, value, atti-
tude, and motivation. 
The National Family Planning Board partnered with 
Population Communication Services (PCS). John 
Hopkins School of Public Health had successfully in-
creased awareness, attitude, and behavior practice on de-
clining population fertility from TFR 5.6 to 2.6 children 
per woman (1970-1995).35,36 Learning from their les-
sons is required. Based on the introduction of the various 
acronym, the MoH, through the Directorate General for 
Communicable Disease Control and Environmental 
Health with the public have used more than 50 years for 
the abbreviation of cleaning, covering, and burying (men-
guras, menutup, dan mengubur, (3M) as an integrated 
tool of source reduction for dengue fever/dengue hemor-
rhagic fever (DF/DHF).37 Introducing 3M for COVID-
19 prevention and control tool, particularly for those liv-
ing in an endemic DF/DHF, confused the public. 
Moreover, the additional acronym of 5M may affect more 
difficult-to-understand limited reading literacy.  
Although, there was no logical explanation for this except 
information. Therefore, the introduction of an acronym 
related to prevention and control should be carefully dis-
cussed with the MoH.
Providing only general information is not enough to 
increase public awareness or behavior practice on 
COVID-19 prevention and control. The public needs to 
involve education, attitude change, and motivation. This 
education includes providing tangible information, per-
sonalized messages (unique message for each audience), 
and interaction with the audience. The information 
should also be communicated with a great cause, target a 
specific audience, and interact. Meanwhile, the attitude 
should be changed through personal value, whether it 
provides physical, mental, or financial benefits.  
Furthermore, changing behavior should set expectations 
and values in learning, sources, and cost. The motivation 
is a social norm where the audience increases community 
awareness and behavior practice on health protocols to 
reduce the number of cases and deaths. Finally, the be-
havior practice should be based on the usual community 
norms of the people.38 The government and their stake-
holders, therefore, need to provide information and in-
clude behavior change through public education, value,
and attitudes to reduce the COVID-19 transmission. 
The Development of Drugs and Vaccines
      To date, there has been no cure for COVID-19. The 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA US) had granted 
emergency with authorization to some treatments, in-
cluding remdesivir, but may provide a modest benefit to 
patients. Their effectiveness against the virus has not 
been demonstrated on large-scale, and randomized clini-
cal trials. Also, scientists are currently studying a wide 
range of other potential treatments, but most are still in 
the early stages of research. Remdesivir is used in criti-
cally ill patients who need oxygen supplementation. It 
blocks the virus's ability to replicate its genetic material. 
Meanwhile, Oseltamivir is an antiviral neuraminidase in-
hibitor used for the treatment and prophylaxis of influen-
za viruses infection. Recently, Lopinavir and ritonavir 
are combined to treat HIV, and some studies have tried 
to stop coronavirus from replicating new cells using 
Hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine. Convalescent 
plasma from the blood of recovered flu patients and rich 
in antibodies, helped the patients fight their illness.39
As the Food and Drug Administration (Badan 
Pengawas Obat dan Makanan/BPOM) granted the 
emergency authorization to use Sinovac, 
Sinopharm, and AstraZeneca vaccines with approval 
from the Indonesian Islamic Clerical Council (Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia/MUI), sub-sequently, the MoH began 
mass vaccination targeting a total of 181.5 million 
people (65.7%) in 34 provinces for 15 months. The first 
vaccination included 1.3 million health workers and 
17.4 million public officials from January-April 2021. 
The remaining was scheduled for 11 months, from April 
to March 2022. At the end of April 2021, a total of 
12.5 million people had completed Sinovac and 
AstraZeneca vaccination. On April 30, it was reported 
that 13 million people had been vaccinated in the 
provinces. Although there were no significant reported 
side effects, monitoring of vaccine distribution and 
side effects should be conducted to guarantee the safe 
completion of the vaccination program. 
Development of local drugs in treatment, GeNose C19 
for testing, Nusantara and Merah Putih vaccines should 
subsequently meet the general scientific principle with 
the outcome receiving the BPOM emergency use 
authorization.40 In addition, approval for the use should 
be obtained from the MUI.
Conclusion 
The current strategic response for COVID-19 in 
Indonesia has not reduced its transmission. The main 
causes include limited response for case management, 
LSSR, with the development of drugs and vaccines, 
strengthening is required. The case manage-ment faced 
challenges of incurability to date, inaccuracy data set, 
low testing number, limited contact tracing, high 
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positivity rate, and CFR. Resolving the critical supply 
and drug shortages for cases treatment increased the 
availability and accessibility of RDT or PCR testing, con-
tact tracing, and health services accessibility, quality, or 
inequality to reduce positivity rate and CFR. 
The large-scale social restriction, including the micro-
scale social restriction has been implemented by most 
provinces, cities, and districts partnered with various 
media. However, most people have not changed their 
behavior practices on the COVID-19 control and 
prevention. Providing only general information is not 
enough for behavior change but community education 
is also required to give tangible, specific, or unique 
information for benefit value. 
Scientists, health professionals, religious leaders, re-
covered patients, and their families have a role in com-
bating disinformation, hence, they should actively ad-
dress the issues. Also, monitoring vaccination programs, 
including the availability of vaccines, distribution, devel-
opment of local ones, and the side effect, is required to 
achieve herd immunity. With the completion of the vac-
cination program, people are still required to wear masks 
and maintain social distance. The current national stan-
dards based on scientific knowledge of the virus, its 
spread, possible mutations, treatment, and prevention, 
research, and development, should be implemented to 
guide strategic and operational decisions.
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